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ABSTRACT
The graphic and bodily facts of a legal question of rights are relevant to the
courts, particularly in questions that directly implicate physical bodies and
pain, such as right to die cases, or what level of search may be allowable and
when. However, in the case of abortion, or more specifically the bodily ramifications of pregnancy and childbirth, this detail is conspicuously absent.
This article, relying on a content analysis of over 220 legal opinions on abortion rights, documents this absence of rhetoric. Particularly in the context of
other discussions of pain and physical health risks in these very same cases,
the complete absence of an acknowledgement of the bodily ramifications
of pregnancy and childbirth appears purposeful, if perhaps not conscious.
Reviewing prior literature on abortion rights and abortion rhetoric, it is
likely that this lack of language both reflects and reinforces an assumption of
women’s roles as mothers, a general reluctance to acknowledge the totality
of the sacrifices women make in giving birth, and the refusal to acknowledge
women’s individual interests as whole persons.
K E Y W O R D S: abortion, bodily integrity, pain, pregnancy, sacrifice, substantive due process
I. INTRODUCTION

It seems that Constitutional protections are often born out of lurid detail, at least if such
detail is to be had. When the Supreme Court first introduced the idea that due process
violations may lead to the reversal of state criminal convictions in Brown v. Mississippi,
† Prof. Laguardia received a JD from New York University Law School in 2007 and a PhD from the Institute
for Law and Society at New York University in 2012. She is also a Criminal Justice Reform Fellow at the
Center for National Security at Fordham Law School. She would very much like to thank professors Venezia
Michalsen, Jeanne Flavin, Jessica Silbey, Karen Greenberg, Sarah Lisa Washington, Dr. Veronica Ades, and
the anonymous reviewers for their comments on this article.
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. All rights reserved. For permissions,
please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/bync-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided
the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work properly cited. For commercial re-use,
please contact journals.permissions@oup.com

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/9/1/lsac003/6548698 by guest on 09 May 2022

Pain that only she must bear: on the
invisibility of women in judicial
abortion rhetoric

2

•

Pain that only she must bear

1 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936).
2 Infra Section II. B.
3 Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed
America’s Prisons, 62 (1998).
4 According to a Westlaw search performed Aug. 30, 2021.
5 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 Eg Nancy K. Lowe, The Nature of Labor Pain, 86 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. S16 (2002). In a frequently
referenced study, Melzack et al. compared 141 Canadian women’s ratings of labor pain using the Pain Rating
Index of the MPQ with the ratings of patients with other pain syndromes and found that mean labor pain
scores were higher in both nulliparous and multiparous women than mean scores previously recorded for
outpatients with back pain, nonterminal cancer pain, phantom limb pain, postherpetic neuralgia, toothache,
or arthritic pain... only patients with acute pain from the amputation of a digit or those with causalgia
reported greater pain on average than women in labor.
7 See, eg Elyssa Spitzer, Pregnancy’s Risks and the Health Exception in Abortion Jurisprudence, 22 Georgetown
J. of Gender & L. 127 (2021) (giving an overview of the risks to women’s health from all pregnancies and
labor).
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it was after a detailed description of the torture that had led to those convictions.1
The doctrines of substantive due process and bodily integrity have continued to rely
on these types of descriptions from stomach pumping, to the right to refuse medical
treatment, to the involuntary insertion of catheters.2 Feeley and Rubin point to the
inclusion of graphic details in trials leading to prison reform.3 But less-bodily rights
may also be based on narrative detail—the exclusionary rule was finalized in Mapp v.
Ohio after a recitation of the way ‘a policeman “grabbed” [Ms. Mapp], “twisted [her]
hand,” and she “yelled [and] pleaded with him” because “it was hurting.” Appellant, in
handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom . . . ’. The phrase ‘screaming
in pain’ appears in over 380 federal judicial opinions, 46 at the circuit court level.4
The graphic and bodily facts of a legal question of rights are relevant to the courts,
particularly in questions that directly implicate physical bodies and pain, such as right
to die cases, or what level of search may be allowable and when.
In this context, given the legal decisions on abortion, one would think childbirth was
painless.
In Roe v. Wade (1973), the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that requiring
a person to carry a fetus to term places considerable physical burdens on that person
but remained vague as to what those burdens would be.5 This is a somewhat surprising
fact, given that childbirth is famous for being one of the most painful experiences in
the spectrum of human discomfort.6 The pain itself, of course, is independent from
the level of physical risk undertaken by women in carrying a child to term, as well as
psychological risk.7 While these risks are not wholly ignored in judicial opinions, they
are blunted, the details hidden, and covered in broad language of ‘burdens’, ‘health’, and
‘risk’ in sharp and stunning contrast to the graphic descriptions courts offer in other
contexts. These rhetorical dodges maintain the ‘burden’ and ‘risk’ of maternity as a
vague unpleasantness, far less striking than the pain and trauma of involuntary medical
searches.
It is the goal of this article to cast light on this difference. When pain, illness, and
risk of death are such fundamental parts of bodily rights and interests, why are the
pain, long-term health implications, and risk of death associated with pregnancy almost
wholly absent from discussions on the right to an abortion? Where is the interest in the
actual physical burden on women of carrying children to term? It seems her interests
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Importance of the Presence of Detail: Language and the Law

‘Social and moral realities.. [are] indeterminate and subject to interpretation . . . We decide
what is, and, almost simultaneously, what ought to be. Narrative habits, patterns of seeing,
shape what we see and that to which we aspire’.9
Language in law not only reflects the values and common understandings in society,
but it also reaffirms and reinforces the social context (or, at times, challenges that
context).10 Through rhetorical choices of narrative and characterization of events,
courts often ‘leave out important ingredients, and, hence, distort’, whether this is
done strategically or instinctively.11 In debates over rights, narrative is an important
ingredient in the perpetuation of dominant beliefs or the opportunity for marginalized
voices to make inroads—in the former case, by restating and reinforcing traditional
imagery and, in the latter, by offering new, compelling stories and recasting established
phenomena in a manner that connects to established values and therefore garners

8 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
9 Richard Delgado, A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411, 2416 (1989).
10 Celeste Michelle Condit, Decoding Abortion Rhetoric 4, 14 (1990); Paula Abrams, The Scarlet
Letter: The Supreme Court and the Language of Abortion Stigma 19 Mich. J. Gender & Law 293, 296 (2012).
11 Condit, supra note 10 at 13; Abrams, supra note 10 at 297; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget
J. Crawford Introduction to the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project, in Feminist Judgements: Rewritten
Opinions of the United States Supreme Court (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget J.
Crawford eds., 2016), 4, 5 (‘what passes for neutral law making and objective legal reasoning is often bound
up in traditional assumptions and power hierarchies . . . Systemic inequalities are not intrinsic to law, but
rather may be rooted in the subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and assumptions of the decision
makers’.).
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are erased in these discussions, dismissed not only as ‘pain that only she must bear’8
but ‘pain that only she must know exists’. Hiding these details both reinforces and
results from a general lack of empathy for women’s physical burdens in pregnancy and
childbirth and the refusal to grant that women might have interests of their own even
to the detriment of their potential children. The failure to accept this idea (that women
deserve to protect themselves sometimes to the detriment of potential children) has
been studied in scholarly literature; but I argue that the treatment of pregnancy and
labor in judicial opinions on abortion is a particularly striking example.
This article proceeds as follows: I begin with a brief overview of the importance of
detail and empathy in legal narratives. To highlight this point, I offer several examples
of the reliance on such details in judicial rhetoric surrounding substantive due process
and bodily integrity. I then review prior studies on the place (and erasure) of women
in judicial rhetoric and the hegemonic acceptance and therefore ignoring of women’s
sacrifices in motherhood. Fascinatingly, while many have studied the treatment and
erasure of women in court opinions, few have looked at the erasure of women’s actual
pain and physical risk in the process of pregnancy and childbirth. I then outline my
data and methods and discuss my findings, limitations, and potential areas for future
research.
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12 Condit, supra note 10 at 25–28 (‘To be persuasive to the dominant audience, the stories had to use rather
than confront the beliefs and social conditions [such as the nuclear family and woman’s primary role as
mother] in the existing American repertoire. The abortion story did so by respecting the crucial values and
characterizations of the culture while redefining the act of abortion itself ’.).
13 Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1574, 1575–76 (1987).
14 Henderson, supra note 13 at 1575.
15 Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 Women’s
Rights L. Rep. 7, 9–10 (1989).
16 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 836–37 (1990); Martha Chamallas,
Importing Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 Wis. Women’s L.J. 389, 389–92 (1997); Kristin
Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, 100 (1984).
17 Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women’s Silence in the Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning,
64 Notre Dame Law Review 185 (1989); Delgado, supra note 9; Condit, supra note 10.
18 Abrams, supra note 10 at 295; Condit, supra note 10 at 96; Douglas NeJaime, The legal mobilization dilemma,
61 Emory L. J. 663 (2011); James Moliterno, The Lawyer as Catalyst of Social Change, 77 Fordham L. Rev.
1559 (2009); Jill Maxwell, Leveraging the Courts to Protect Women’s Fundamental Rights at the Intersection of
Family-Work Structures and Women’s Role as Wage Earner and Primary Caregiver, 20 Duke J. of Gender L.
Pol’y 127 (2012).
19 Jules Lobel, Success without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to Justice in America (2003)
20 Laura Beth Nielsen, Social Movements, Social Process: A Response to Gerald Rosenberg, 42 John Marshall
L. Rev. 671 (2009).
21 Luker, supra note 16 at 100–101; 105–08.
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empathy.12 Dominant ideologies and legality in particular may strive to evade these
stories and details in an effort to avoid that empathy.13 Some have argued that legality
in particular is unsuited to consideration of ‘how people do live’, as an allowance for
empathy and response to personal circumstances would undermine the predictability
and rationality of law as well as dominant power structures.14 ‘Nitty-gritty detail’, is
a necessary aspect of humanizing neglected groups and focusing on their burdens,
forcing the law to bend to actual equality, while abstraction and detachment from
lived conditions of marginalized people allow law to pretend to equality while avoiding
it in practice.15 This abstraction is one of the ways that law may ‘without justification submerge the perspectives of women and other marginalized groups’, thereby
protecting their continued subordination; and it is one reason feminist legal scholars
emphasize the need to increase awareness of the actual experiences of those affected
by legal principles.16 At times, particularly compelling stories may break through these
protections, enabling progress for marginalized voices.17
Narratives, characterizations, and representations that do make their way into the
language of Supreme Court opinions can gain legal coercive power and authority;
but even legal language that does not make it this far or is unsuccessful can gain
publicity and social and political power by becoming ‘part of the social discourse, a high
profile, highly public commentary that becomes the foundation for further political
strategy and action’.18 Even rhetoric that loses in court is often used to mobilize reform
efforts and change future outlooks.19 Litigation and legal language can change the way
people see their own situation and possibilities for change.20 In the specific instance
of the abortion debate, Kristen Luker has highlighted the way that the legal argument
itself was ‘consciousness raising’ for women who already had personal experience with
the damage caused by restrictive abortion laws; until activists specifically offered the
opportunity and reasoning for legal change, it did not occur to these women that things
could or should be different.21
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B. The Body in Law: Bodily Integrity and Substantive Due Process

One area of law and American civil liberties where nitty-gritty details have often accompanied legal development is that of bodily integrity and substantive due process. In
1891, the Supreme Court stated that ‘No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law. The right to one’s person may be said to be
a right of complete immunity: to be let alone’.25 Even further, the Court stated ‘The
inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure
as by a blow. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault,
and a trespass’.
Since then, the right to bodily integrity has been reaffirmed in several cases, often
focusing on the specific bodily nature of the invasion. A right of substantive due process
against physical intrusions into the body as part of a criminal search was established in
Rochin v. California, wherein Justice Frankfurter focused on the fact that ‘a doctor forced
an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin’s stomach against his will’, producing
vomiting, in order to search for narcotics.26 Such treatment, Justice Frankfurter found,
was ‘too close to the rack and screw’ and amounted to physical abuse.27 In Winston v. Lee,
the Supreme Court stated that, even given a compelling state interest, surgical searches
of individuals may be unjustifiable if they endanger the life or health of the suspect and
that judging the reasonableness of the intrusion into an individual’s bodily integrity
may depend in part on whether it involves ‘risk, trauma, or pain’.28 In coming to this
22 Bridget Crawford, Kathryn Stanchi, and Linda Berger, Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and
Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. Baltimore L. Rev. 167, 184, 186 (2018); Berta Esperanza
Hernández-Truyol, Talking Back: From Feminist History and Theory to Feminist Legal Methods and Judgments,
in Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court, 49–51
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016), 49–51; Finley, supra note 17
at 185.
23 Hernández-Truyol, supra note 22 at 51; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989).
24 James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 684, 697 (1985).
25 Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 251 (1891).
26 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
27 342 U.S. 172.
28 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
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For all these reasons, rhetoric in legal cases is important; and, even when oppositional narratives do not succeed in making their way into judicial language, the
judicial rhetoric provides a window into the values, assumptions, and narratives that are
credited and relied upon by courts as well as those that are dismissed. Critical reading
of legal opinions may bring light to hidden biases and ‘realities of life’ that have been
glossed over due to the pervasiveness and self-assurance of dominant perspectives,
thereby ‘unearthing otherwise hidden factors’.22 Such hidden factors may often include
the perspectives of women and even more so women of color, who exist as ‘distanced
outsiders, invisible in the long shadows’ of the law.23 This may illuminate the voices
that law has not allowed to be heard.24
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decision, the Court favorably cited nearly a dozen federal cases in the lower courts and
emphasized the problems with ‘probing beneath [a suspect’s] skin’, echoing its own
description, one page prior, of an earlier case that involved ‘intruding into [a suspect’s]
body’.29 The Court also made a point of reciting the evidence of level of risk to the
suspect’s body, and the level of invasion, in some graphic language.

In these cases, the Court presented a fact specific analysis relying on the extent of
bodily invasion, dignitary offense, and physical risk of harm to the individual, and lower
courts have responded by focusing on details. For example, in George v. Edholm, the
Ninth Circuit focused on the pain of an anal search, retelling the words of the plaintiff
for effect: ‘I was screaming I was hollering because it hurted. . . . that violated me’ . . . .
The court also mentioned the significant pain and bleeding the search caused, ‘that
continued after he left the hospital’, and detailed the search involved:
‘[Edholm] opened George’s anus with an anoscope and inserted long forceps into George’s
rectum. He inserted a tube into George’s nose, ran the tube into George’s stomach, and pumped
a gallon of liquid laxative through George’s digestive system, triggering a complete evacuation
of George’s bowels . . . These procedures were “highly intrusive and humiliating.” . . . “targeted
an area of the body that is highly personal and private”’.31

Similarly, in 2013 the Sixth Circuit determined that a digital rectal examination of
a suspect was unreasonable. The court stated that the factors to be balanced in this
determination were: (i) ‘the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or
health of the individual’, (ii) ‘the extent of intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity’, and (iii) ‘the community’s interest in
fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence’.32
The court then emphasized that the suspect was ‘naked and handcuffed, [] paralyzed, intubated, and anally probed without his consent’, and painstakingly retold the
details of the intubation and anal probe of the suspect.33
At the trial level, the exploration of bodily invasion is even more detailed. In forced
catheterization cases, for instance, courts often focus on the pain, the suspect’s screams,
and the ramifications of the catheterization after the fact. For instance, in Elliott v. Sheriff
of Rush Cty., Ind., the court bothered to retell that
29
30
31
32
33

470 U.S. 760.
470 U.S. 764–65.
752 F.3d 1206, 1212, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2014).
U.S. v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535, 546 (6th Cir.2013).
U.S. v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535, 547 (6th Cir.2013).
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‘One surgeon had testified that the difficulty of discovering the exact location of the bullet “could
require extensive probing and retracting of the muscle tissue,” carrying with it “the concomitant
risks of injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood vessels and other tissue in the
chest and pleural cavity.” . . . The court further noted that “the greater intrusion and the larger
incisions increase the risks of infection.”...the Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth
proposes to take control of respondent’s body, to “drug this citizen—not yet convicted of a
criminal offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness” . . . and then
to search beneath his skin’30 .
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‘Deputy Drake and Officer Doug Keith... handcuffed Plaintiff to the surgical table, pulled his
pants down, and held Plaintiff’s legs in a spread-eagle position . . . . Plaintiff testified, “They
were pinning my legs down, yelling at me, telling me to quit screaming, telling me not to cuss
at the lady. Telling me I swear to God this and pinning me down, holding me down while she
shoved a catheter in me.” . . . The procedure was extremely painful, as it required Nurse Tressler
to insert a 15 inch catheter up Plaintiff’s penis and into his bladder . . . Deputy Drake described
Plaintiff as “grunting” and “showing pain” as the catheter was inserted’.34

02:38: Nurse Pam Templeton starts inserting the catheter.
02:40–02:43: Holcombe says, “Oh God almighty, damn!” He scrunches up in what looks like
pain and brings his hands down, making contact with Nurse Templeton’s arm. Holcombe brings
his hands back up, covers his face, and moans.
02:43: An officer places his hand on Holcombe’s arm and keeps it there . . .
Holcombe recalled the catheterization as causing “lots of pain”; “I’ve never been through
anything like that before in my life. And it felt like it bottomed out in me. And then I think she
pulled back a little bit and then it started bleeding off into the cup, the thing that they were trying
to put the urine in.” . . . Holcombe felt “degraded” by the catheterization and said he still suffers
emotionally. ... He said that it burns when he urinates and that, two or three times a week, he
has difficulty urinating.35

These details appear even in cases like Elliott, where the court eventually determined
that case law already settled whether catheterization was a sufficient bodily invasion
to qualify as a search, and even in the circumstance of catheterization, which takes
between seconds and a few minutes to complete.
Outside of the case of pregnancy, then, pain, physical invasion, and affront to dignity
can be a significant enough intrusion on bodily integrity that even a compelling interest
does not justify it, and the actual pain and bodily invasion itself is therefore something
to be explored by lawyers and judges in a fact-specific and rhetorically compelling
manner. Pregnancy and labor carry extensive bodily repercussions (briefly explored
in Section II.C), and the right to an abortion is in part based on the same rights of
substantive due process and bodily integrity that underlie the above cases. One might
therefore expect that the extent of the bodily implications of pregnancy and labor would
be explored similarly at least in a number of trial-level (fact-specific) judicial opinions.
However, the historical treatment of women in the law offers reason to think these
burdens of motherhood might, instead, be ignored.
C. The Physicality of Pregnancy and Childbirth

Given the relevance pain and physical invasion carry in law, it is worth offering some
description of the pain, physical risk, and physical invasion that are the inherent and
natural aspects of pregnancy and childbirth. Pregnancy and childbirth are inherently
dangerous for the pregnant person. Pregnant people are immunocompromised, more
likely to die or suffer severe illness from diseases such as the flu, and the course of
34 Elliott v. Sheriff of Rush Cty., Ind., 686 F. Supp. 2d 840, 851–52 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (Citations omitted).
35 Riis v. Shaver, 458 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1146–47 (D.S.D. 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20–1958, 2020 WL
6580487 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2020), and aff’d, 4 F.4th 701 (8th Cir. 2021).

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/9/1/lsac003/6548698 by guest on 09 May 2022

Similarly, in Riis v. Shaver the district court recounts:
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36 Spitzer, supra note 7; Francesca Laguardia, If the Fetus is a Person—Is It Relevant? An Argument on the Rights
of Pregnant Women, 56 No. 5 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 9 (2020); Luo, Yongwen, and Kai Yin, Management
of pregnant women infected with COVID-19, 20 Lancet Infect. Dis. 513 (2020).
37 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, https://
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm
(accessed Aug. 27, 2021).
38 Gianna Melillo, Racial Disparities Persist in Maternal Morbidity, Mortality and Infant Health, Proceedings
of the American Diabetes Association’s 80th Scientific Sessions ( June 13, 2020), https://www.a
jmc.com/view/racial-disparities-persist-in-maternal-morbidity-mortality-and-infant-health.
39 Melillo, supra note 38 and Katherine Kortsmit, Tara C. Jatlaoui, Michele G. Mandel; Jennifer A. Reeves,
Titilope Oduyebo, Emily Petersen, and Maura K. Whiteman, Abortion Surveillance—United States 2018
Surveillance Summaries, table 14 (November 27, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/
ss/ss6907a1.htm#T14_down.
40 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1987) at 4, 8, 12–13.
41 Daniel Goldberg, Pain, Objectivity and History: Understanding Pain Stigma, 43 Med. Humanities 238
(2017); Maya Dusenberry, Doing Harm: The Truth About How Bad medicine and Lazy Science
Leave Women Dismissed, Misdiagnosed, and Sick, 100–101 (2018).
42 Goldberg, supra note 41; Daniel Goldberg, INTRODUCTION: On Stigma & Health, 45 J. Law Med.
Ethics 475 (2017); Diane Hoffman, & Anita Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias against Women in
the Treatment of Pain, 29 J. Law Med. Ethics 13 (2001); Dusenberry, supra note 41 at 100–101.
43 Goldberg, supra note 41; Hoffman & Tarzian, supra note 42.
44 Hoffman and Tarzian, supra note 42; Dusenberry, supra note 41 at 94–105.
45 Saraswathi Vedam, Kathrin Stoll, Tanya Khemet Taiwo, Nicholas Rubashkin, Melissa Cheyney, Nan Strauss,
Monica McLemore, Micaela Cadena, Elizabeth Nethery, Eleanor Rushton, Laura Schummers, Eugene
Declercq, and the GVtM-US Steering Council, The Giving Voice to Mothers study: inequity and mistreatment
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pregnancy can lead to severe health risks long after giving birth, including sciatica and
heart attack.36 Childbirth can be deadly, resulting in hemorrhage or sepsis, and rates
of maternal death have been steadily increasing over the last 30 years.37 Black women
are at particular risk, dying in childbirth at over three times the rate of White women.38
Judging by maternal mortality rates, abortion is 25 times safer than carrying a child
to term for non-Black women and over 38 times safer than carrying a child to term
for Black women.39 But these statistics, if stark, barely scrape the surface of the type
of narrative one might expect in the light of the descriptions of forced catheterization
provided above.
It is difficult, in the context of an academic journal, to reach the type of descriptive
language that might be used for several reasons. First, pain is difficult to describe. Elaine
Scarry famously stated that pain destroys language, reducing the individual to a prelanguage state and that even if medical language could begin to approach description of
pain, the inevitable inaccuracy of language in describing pain makes political choices
like the use of torture possible.40 Moreover, pain is subjective and, to the observer,
untestable, which has led society, courts, doctors, and even those suffering to doubt
that their pain is ‘real’.41 Instead, pain may be discounted as purely psychosomatic,
imagined, or outright false, and patients who complain of chronic or uncredited pain
may become stigmatized, further encouraging the dismissal of their complaints.42 This
dismissal is even more likely when the sufferer is a member of an already stigmatized
group, as are women and people of color.43 Women’s complaints of pain are often
disbelieved either because they are seen as hysterical or because their efforts to avoid
that image make them seem to be coping too well to be in serious pain.44 Black and
indigenous women experience this stigma even more intensely, as it intersects with
racism and remaining racist tropes that Black women do not feel pain.45
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46

47

48
49
50

during pregnancy and childbirth in the United States, 16 Reprod. Health 1 (2019); Hoffman, Kelly M.,
Sophie Trawalter, Jordan R. Axt, and M. Norman Oliver, Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment
Recommendations, and False beliefs about Biological Differences between Blacks and Whites, 113 PNAS 4296
(2016); Dána-Ain Davis, Obstetric Racism: The Racial Politics of Pregnancy, Labor, and Birthing, 38 Med.
Anthropol. 560 (2019); see also Tressie Mcmillan Cottom, Thick, 81–89 (2019).
See, eg discussions of doctors’ response to pelvic pain and lower back pain associated with pregnancy: Helen
Elden, Ingela Lundgren, and Eva Robertson, The Pelvic Ring of Pain: Pregnant Women’s Experiences of Severe
Pelvic Girdle Pain: An Interview Study, 2 Clin. Nurs. Stud. 30, 38 (2014); Eva Haukeland Fredriksen, Karen
Marie Moland, and Johanne Sundby, ‘Listen to Your Body’: A Qualitative Text Analysis of Internet Discussions
Related to Pregnancy Health and Pelvic Girdle Pain in Pregnancy, 73 Patient Educ. Couns. 294, 297 (2008);
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Daily Life and Enduring Pain’: A Qualitative Study of the Experiences of Pregnant Women Living with Pelvic
Girdle Pain, 13 BMC Pregnancy Childbirth 111 (2013).
Dusenberry, supra note 41, at 219–222; Rebecca Greene, Pamela Stratton, Sean D. Cleary, Mary Lou Ballweg, and Ninet Sinaii, Diagnostic Experience among 4,334 Women Reporting Surgically Diagnosed Endometriosis, 91 Fertility sterility 32 (2009); Mary Lou Ballweg, Blaming the Victim: The Psychologizing of
Endometriosis, 24 Obstet. and Gynecol. Clinics 441 (1997).
449 U.S. 297, 354 (1980) ( J. Stevens, Dissenting); see also Eileen McDonagh, Breaking the Abortion
Deadlock: From Choice to Consent, 28–29 (1996).
Hoffman and Tarzian, supra note 42; Dusenberry, supra note 41 at 94–105.
Zevia Schneider, An Australian Study of Women’s Experiences of Their First Pregnancy, 18 Midwifery 238,
243 (2002); Persson et al., supra note 46; Helen Elden, Ingela Lundgren, and Eva Robertson, Life’s Pregnant
Pause of Pain: Pregnant Women’s Experiences of Pelvic Girdle Pain Related to Daily Life: A Swedish Interview
Study, 4 Sexual Reprod. Healthcare 29 (2013). See also Margaret A. Crichton and Vanda K. Wellock,
Pain, Disability and Symphysis Pubis Dysfunction: Women Talking, 6 Evidence-Based Midwifery 9 (2008)
(‘Some of the women smiled at their recollections, particularly if their husband or partner had described
the movement with humour. This use of humour may have been in an effort to explain or mask the
embarrassment they might have felt’.).
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Just as this stigma is more likely to occur in regard to already stigmatized groups,
medical research has documented the refusal to acknowledge the extent of suffering
women experience during pregnancy specifically and afterward. Doctors (and society)
dismiss several crippling pregnancy-related pains as ‘normal’ without describing or
acknowledging the extent of pain, such as pelvic and lower back pain.46 This response
to the suffering of pregnancy echoes doctors’ common responses to other specifically
female pain, such as that of endometriosis, or menstrual pain, which is often dismissed
as ‘normal period pain’.47 It is also echoed in law, for instance, in Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion in Harris v. McRae that ‘the government may properly presume that
no harm will ensue from normal childbirth’. (emphasis added).48
But dismissal by others is not the only reason these descriptions are difficult to find.
Women, feeling these social pressures, also edit themselves in describing their pain.
Some hide their pain in an effort to avoid looking hysterical.49 Others downplay their
pain out of embarrassment, or a feeling of guilt that they are not adequately coping with
a ‘normal’ process.50 Additionally, some research theorizes that women subconsciously
avoid associating their children with the pain of pregnancy and childbirth and therefore
modify the language they use to describe it (instructed to label ‘excruciating pain’ at a
certain numeric level will use the number but refuse to use the word ‘excruciating’).51
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For all these reasons, it is difficult to find stirring, affective descriptions of the pain
associated with pregnancy and giving birth. Moreover, the conditions that occur over
the course of pregnancy, childbirth, and postpartum are too numerous to be described
outside of a textbook, and accumulating women’s narratives would be beyond the scope
of this project. The following sections make an effort to offer the beginnings of such a
description, but the reader should be advised they are, necessarily, inadequate.

51 Lowe, supra note 6.
52 Marlena S. Fejzo, Sue Ann Ingles, Melissa Wilson, Wei Wang, Kimber MacGibbon, Roberto Romero,
and Thomas M. Goodwin. High Prevalence of Severe Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnancy and Hyperemesis
Gravidarum among Relatives of Affected Individuals, 141 European j. obstet. gynecol. reprod. biol. 13
(2008); Lindsey J. Wegrzyniak, John T. Repke, and Serdar H. Ural, Treatment of Hyperemesis Gravidarum, 5
Rev. obstet. gynecol. 78 (2012).
53 Renee Lacroix, Erica Eason, and Ronald Melzack, Nausea and Vomiting during Pregnancy: A Prospective Study
of Its Frequency, Intensity, and Patterns of Change, 182 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 931 (2000).
54 Kristine Heitmann, Hedvig Nordeng, Gro C. Havnen, Anja Solheimsnes, and Lone Holst, The Burden of
Nausea and Vomiting during Pregnancy: Severe Impacts on Quality of Life, Daily Life Functioning and Willingness
to Become Pregnant Again–Results from a Cross-Sectional Study, 17 BMC pregnancy childbirth 1 (2017).
55 Lacroix et al., supra note 53 at 933–34.
56 Louise Locock, Jo Alexander, and Linda Rozmovits, Women’s Responses to Nausea and Vomiting in Pregnancy,
24 Midwifery 143 (2008).
57 Heitmann et al., supra note 54.
58 Eg Eva Dasher, 7 Common Pregnancy Aches and Pains, Babycenter.com (December 29, 2020), https://
www.babycenter.com/pregnancy/your-body/7-common-pregnancy-aches-and-pains_10327839;
American Pregnancy Association, Sharp Pregnancy Pains, https://americanpregnancy.org/healthy-pregna
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1. Pregnancy
Pregnancy itself lasts, approximately, for 9 months, and it can be months of starvation,
severe dehydration, and muscle wasting if the pregnant person suffers from hyperemesis gravidarum, causing the hospitalization of 10s of 1000s of women every year.52
However, well before reaching hyperemesis gravidarum, ‘normal’ pregnancy-related
nausea and vomiting ‘has a pervasive, detrimental impact on women’s family, social,
and professional lives’.53 Nausea occurs in 70–80% of pregnancies, and, according to
at least one study, brings the quality of life down to a level roughly comparable to that
of women suffering from fibromyalgia or post-traumatic stress disorder.54 While 50%
of pregnant people are relieved of nausea and vomiting the end of the first trimester,
10% will continue to experience the symptoms past 22 weeks, and for some women,
symptoms may last the entire pregnancy.55 Women’s own descriptions of nausea are
intense: ‘I was just vomiting constantly . . . .It would be so severe that I’d be crying at the end
of it. It was really, really bad, but you know, it was something that I knew I had to suffer . . . .I
just felt like, “When is this going to end? . . . ”’. ‘People said three months, it should finish
for three months. It went on and on and on, and I just couldn’t cope . . . ’.56 During this
time, work and family life is impaired, with a majority of women stating that it caused
difficulties with their partners, majorly adversely affected their ability to care for their
children, and forced them onto sick leave.57 Of course, very few women have the ability
to simply absent themselves from work for months, so women instead are forced to
work through their suffering.
Pregnancy also very commonly results in general pains and discomfort such as
headaches, carpal tunnel pain, back pain, round ligament pain, heartburn, hemorrhoids,
leg cramps, sciatica, dizziness, and urinary leaking.58 These pains are less treatable than
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ncy/pregnancy-complications/sharp-pain-pregnancy/; Office on Women’s Health, Body Changes and
Discomforts, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregna
ncy/youre-pregnant-now-what/body-changes-and-discomforts.
American Pregnancy Association, supra note 58; Office on Women’s Health, supra note 58.
Gutke et al., supra note 46 at 511; see also Mackenzie et al., supra note 46, estimating severe pain from PGP
occurs in 14–22% of pregnancies.
Mackenzie et al., supra note 46.
Ciara Close, Marlene Sinclair, Dianne Liddle, Julie Mc Cullough, and Ciara Hughes, Women’s Experience of
Low Back and/or Pelvic Pain (LBPP) during Pregnancy, 37 Midwifery 1, 4 (2016).
Persson et al., supra note 46.
Vanda K. Wellock and Margaret A. Crichton, Understanding Pregnant Women’s Experiences of Symphysis
Pubis Dysfunction: the effect of pain, 5 Evidence-Based Midwifery 40 (2007).
Elden et al., supra note 46, at 35.
Elden et al., supra note 46, at 35.
Elden et al., supra note 46, at 35.
Wellock and Crichton, supra note 64.
Crichton and Wellock, supra note 50.
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they would be in non-pregnant individuals, as many medications are restricted during
pregnancy. Instead, pregnant people are advised to ‘go on a walk’, apply heat, or practice
breathing exercises in order to cope with their discomfort.59
Just how bad is this pain? One category of pregnancy discomfort that has received
attention recently is that of lower back and pelvic girdle pain (PGP). Studies suggest
that PGP and lower back pain occur in approximately 50% of pregnant people and that
20% of pregnant people experience severe enough PGP to require medical assistance.60
The pain itself is described as exhausting, interfering with daily life, and constant.61
Women describe it as ‘“excruciatingly sore at night . . . It was horrific . . . It was scary not
being able to walk properly . . . I felt rotten all the time.”62 . . . “I had an enormous pain,
which was inconceivable . . . I thought I would break into two parts . . . ”63 . . . “all I know
is I couldn’t control how much pain . . . I couldn’t hold it in . . . ”’64 .
Elden et al. state one theme of women’s narratives on PGP is that ‘pain dominates
their existence’.65 They describe women experiencing immobility, ‘the feeling of being
paralyzed. During the night, they didn’t even dare to walk to the bathroom, but crawled
instead. Some women suffered this immobility for a short while, others for a couple
of hours, and some up to twelve hours before the sensation past’.66 As these attacks
can recur, women live their lives in fear of triggering their return, making the pain,
immobility, and compensation for it a constant part of their lives.67 The pain itself can
also be constant. Wellock and Crichton mention two women, one of whom emailed
that she intended to kill herself and another who threatened her doctors that she would
kill herself if they did not ‘end[] her pain by performing a cesarean section’.68
In a separate article, the same team describes the incapacity and embarrassment
caused by this ‘normal’ pain (the following quotes are from three separate women): ‘I
was cooking you know and when I feel I want to go to the toilet I feel it suddenly . . . . I couldn’t
reach upstairs and I was very much in pain . . . “(sobs)” “Sometimes in the bedroom, 1 have
to roll on to the floor . . . and you get up to go to the bathroom and it’s very difficult . . .
one time I bad to crawl to the bathroom . . . ” (This woman reported that she wet herself
before she reached the bathroom and became very upset)’.69
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70 Lowe, supra note 6; Cynthia Wong, Advances in Labor Analgesia, 1 Int. j. women’s health 139 (2010).
71 Spitzer, supra note 7 at 160 and 195 and 218–220; Wong, supra note 70.
72 See, eg Markus Harry Jansson, Karin Franzén, Ayako Hiyoshi, Gunilla Tegerstedt, Hedda Dahlgren,
and Kerstin Nilsson, Risk Factors for Perineal and Vaginal Tears in Primiparous Women—The Prospective
POPRACT-Cohort Study, 20 BMC Pregnancy Childbirth 749 (2020).
73 Lynn Clark Callister, Inaam Khalaf, Sonia Semenic, Robin Kartchner, and Katri Vehvilainen-Julkunen, The
Pain of Childbirth: Perceptions of Culturally Diverse Women, 4 Pain Manag. Nurs. 145 (2003).
74 Callister et al., supra note 73; Natalie Van der Gucht and Kiara Lewis, Women’s Experiences of Coping with
Pain during Childbirth: A Critical Review of Qualitative Research, 31 Midwifery 349 (2015).
75 Cynthia A. Wong, Barbara M. Scavone, Alan M. Peaceman, Robert J. McCarthy, John T. Sullivan, Nathaniel
T. Diaz, Edward Yaghmour R-Jay L. Marcus, Saadia S. Sherwani, Michelle T. Sproviero, Meltem Yilmaz,
Roshani Patel, Carmen Robles, and Sharon Grouper, The Risk of Cesarean Delivery with Neuraxial Analgesia
Given Early Versus Late in Labor, 352 New England J. Med. 655 (2005); Callister et al., supra note
73. See also Elysha Krupp, Women Are Being Denied Epidurals during Childbirth. Here’s Why, Vice.com
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en/article/8x7mm4/childbirth-pain-relief-denied; Amelia Hill,
I Asked Three Times for an Epidural’: Why Are Women Being Denied Pain Relief during Childbirth?
theguardian.com (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/mar/04/i-askedthree-times-for-an-epidural-why-are-women-being-denied-pain-relief.
76 See, eg Maressa Brown, Viral TikTok Shows You the Size of an Epidural Needle, and Moms Could Have Told You,
Yes, It’s Huge, Parents.com (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.parents.com/news/viral-tiktok-shows-you-thesize-of-an-epidural-needle-and-moms-could-have-told-you-its-huge/; David Mayer and Kathleen Smith,
Childbirth, Frequently Asked Questions, The University of North Carolina School of Medicine,
Department of Anesthesiology, https://www.med.unc.edu/anesthesiology/patients/childbirth-1/.
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2. Labor
The most famous aspect of giving birth is the pain and bodily damage of labor itself.
Labor is widely understood to be one of the most painful events in human experience
if not the most painful.70 It is, in fact, defined as pain; specifically the lower back,
pelvic, and vaginal pain that are caused by contractions, tissue distension, stretching,
and tearing associated with cervical dilation as well as by the pressure and stretching
of bone, muscle, and tissue, which are associated with pushing a baby’s head through
one’s birth canal and vagina.71 Eighty per cent of women experience vaginal or perineal
tearing during labor.72
The pain of labor is well publicized but rarely described; and when it is described,
the value of childbirth generally precedes the description or follows quickly on its heels.
One study, for instance, presents the following descriptions: ‘“There are no words to
describe the pain you have to go through. All I wanted was for [the baby] to hurry up and come
out. But you won’t remember once it’s over. That’s why you give birth again.” . . . “When I
was in labor, the pain was something I had never experienced in the whole world. Right before
the baby was born there was more pain than I could think of .”’ The authors of the study
note of some participants; ‘Sometimes they cried out to the Lord, saying, “Dios mio!
Jnopeudo! Jnoguantomas!” or “My God! I can’t bear it any more!” but they accepted pain
as an obligation of a woman’s life, with stoic dignity and courage’.73 It is worth noting
that these studies often describe women’s desire to have a child as one of the primary
aspects of women’s ability to cope with their pain.74
Pain during labor is most commonly treated with an epidural, but epidurals are
often delayed or denied to women if doctors believe they are not sufficiently dilated
or that they are too close to giving birth.75 Additionally, this form of anesthesia,
which requires an unusually large needle inserted into the patient’s spine as the patient
attempts to hold still while experiencing contractions,76 can itself result in extremely
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‘I wanted an epidural. I spent most of the time screaming, “I want an epidural; I’m not doing
this, I’m going home!” I gave birth completely natural with no medication whatsoever, and I was
hysterical. I did not want that. I don’t like pain, and it hurts very bad, and I don’t understand
why any woman would want to birth naturally’.
Another stated ‘I was hoping to get [the epidural] right away, but when they told me 30
minutes, I give up . . . so I started to scream’.

While another described the time before her epidural as ‘I was just like almost on the
floor, like it [the pain] was really bad . . . you don’t want to overreact, but it is so much pain
that you do not know what to do’. 82
These experiences all contribute to birth trauma, which can lead to postpartum
depression and PTSD, as can fear of the epidural itself, inadequate pain relief, use of
forceps, or a prolonged labor, among other birthing experiences.83 Labor may bring
about PTSD in up to 9% of women,84 and as much as a third of women may experience
some form of trauma during labor.85 These experiences can run from being ignored
and forced into medical procedures one has not consented to, to a feeling of violation
as providers dig inside one’s body. Women recall: ‘“I was crying and screaming in pain
telling her no and to stop and she carried on, my husband shouted at her to leave me alone
77 NHS Health ATOZ: Epidural Side Effects, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/epidural/side-effects/;
American Pregnancy Association, What Is an Epidural?, https://americanpregnancy.org/healthy-pregna
ncy/labor-and-birth/what-is-an-epidural/.
78 Eugene Declercq, Deborah K. Cunningham, Cynthia Johnson, and Carol Sakala, Mothers’ Reports of
Postpartum Pain Associated with Vaginal and Cesarean Deliveries: Results of a National Survey, 35 Birth 16
(2008).
79 Spitzer, supra note 7 at 161; George Rust, Wendy N. Nembhard, Michelle Nichols, Folashade Omole,
Patrick Minor, Gerrie Barosso, and Robert Mayberry, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Provision of Epidural
Analgesia to Georgia Medicaid Beneficiaries during Labor and Delivery, 191 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.456
(2004); Katherine M. Johnson and Richard M. Simon, Privilege in the Delivery Room? Race, Class, and the
Realization of Natural Birth Preferences, 2002–2013, 68 Social Problems 552 (2021).
80 Vani A. Mathur, Theresa Morris, and Kelly McNamara, Cultural Conceptions of Women’s Labor Pain and
Labor Pain Management: A mixed-method analysis, 261 Soc. Sci. Med. 113240 (2020).
81 Mathur, supra note 80.
82 Gill Thomson, Claire Feeley, Victoria Hall Moran, Soo Downe, and Olufemi T. Oladapo, Women’s
Experiences of Pharmacological and Non-Pharmacological Pain Relief Methods for Labour and Childbirth: A
Qualitative Systematic Review, 16 Reproductive health 1 (2019).
83 Cheryl Tatano Beck, Birth Trauma: In the Eye of the Beholder, 53 Nursing res. 28 (2004).
84 Cheryl Tatano Beck, Robert K. Gable, Carol Sakala, and Eugene R. Declercq, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
in New Mothers: Results from a Two-Stage US National Survey, 38 Birth 216 (2011).
85 Beck, supra note 84; Debra K. Creedy, Ian M. Shochet, and Jan Horsfall, Childbirth and the Development of
Acute Trauma Symptoms: Incidence and Contributing Factors, 27 Birth 104 (2000).
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painful headaches as well as bleeding, convulsions, severe blood pressure drop, and in
rare cases, permanent nerve damage.77 Epidurals may also be associated with longerlasting postpartum pain.78 Anesthesia may also be withheld, or delivered poorly, and
(like maternal mortality) this has been found to be a particular problem for Black and
Hispanic pregnant people,79 likely due to enduring racial stereotypes and incorrect
beliefs that Black and Hispanic pregnant people experience less pain.80 Moreover,
epidurals do sometimes fail, and this, too, appears to occur more often and with less
acknowledgment in the cases of Black and Hispanic pregnant people.81
One study recounts women’s descriptions of being refused an epidural:

14

•

Pain that only she must bear

3. Postpartum
The pain of pregnancy and labor are not over once the laboring is done. In 2008, one
study reported that more than 70% of women who delivered vaginally for the first
time report perineal pain, with more than 30% describing it as a major problem.87
Nearly 80% of women who deliver via cesarean birth report experiencing pain due
to their incision in the first 2 months postpartum, with close to 45% describing it
as a major problem.88 Eighteen per cent of women who deliver via cesarean section
still experienced pain at the site of their incision 6 months after delivery. More recent
research suggests that 20% of women who deliver via c-section and 11% of women who
deliver naturally experience pain as a major problem 2 months after delivering, while
16% of women who deliver via c-section and 7% of women who deliver naturally still
experience pain as a major problem 6 months after delivery.89 More than three quarters
of mothers say pain interferes with their daily routines at least a little bit 2 months
after delivering, with 26% of women who deliver via c-section and 9% of women who
deliver naturally stating pain interferes ‘quite a bit’.90 A 2008 study found that 36% of
women post-cesarean section and 60% of women post vaginal delivery experienced
daily or constant pain at 2 months postpartum, possibly affecting over 500,000 women
annually.91
Women’s descriptions of their pain are harder to come by in these areas. These
missing data are recognized in medical literature in part as a result of women’s lack
of descriptive language and embarrassment regarding their pain.92 However, articles
record women describing post-cesarean pain, stating ‘“[T]he first three weeks . . . three or
four weeks, it was like really painful and sore. I couldn’t even bend,” . . . “I couldn’t lie down
at night because there was like a dragging and pulling feeling, which was very, very painful.
86 Rachel Reed, Rachael Sharman, and Christian Inglis, Women’s Descriptions of Childbirth Trauma Relating to
Care Provider Actions and Interactions, 17 BMC pregnancy childbirth 1 (2017).
87 Declercq et al., supra note 78, at 19.
88 Declercq et al., supra note 78, at 19.
89 Eugene R. Declercq , Carol Sakala, Maureen P. Corry, Sandra Applebaum, and Ariel
Herrlich, Listening To Mothers III: Pregnancy And Birth Report Of The Third National
U.S. Survey Of Women’s Childbearing Experiences, XIV (May, 2013), https://www.nationalpa
rtnership.org/our-work/resources/health-care/maternity/listening-to-mothers-iii-pregnancy-and-bi
rth-2013.pdf.
90 Declercq et al., supra note 90, at XIV.
91 James C. Eisenach, Peter H. Pan, Richard Smiley, Patricia Lavand’homme, Ruth Landau, and Timothy T.
Houle, Severity of Acute Pain after Childbirth, But Not Type of Delivery, Predicts Persistent Pain and Postpartum
Depression, 140 Pain 87 (2008): 87–94.
92 Eisenach et al., supra note 92.
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and she carried on . . . ” “she grabbed my cervix and pinched it. She would not let go until
I consented to letting her break my water. I was in tears from the pain, screaming, begging
and sobbing for her to let go and get her hand out of my vagina. She would not let go until I
consented, which I finally did . . . ” “She proceeded to dig out my uterus without any numbing
medication. It was horrifying”’.86
In sum, whether women request (or are given) an epidural or not, whether any
anesthesia works or not, and whether women deliver via assisted or unassisted vaginal
delivery or the major surgery that is a cesarean delivery, childbirth is an intensely
physical and all-too-often traumatic event.
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101 See notes 89 and 90, supra, and accompanying text.
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157 (2016).
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I couldn’t move at one point, I had to get my husband to help”’.93 The same study notes
‘One woman normalised the extreme pain she had experienced (pain caused by an
undiagnosed haematoma), stating that she “just thought everybody” who underwent
CSs had similarly “excruciating pain.”’94 Another study records women stating ‘You
can’t laugh or move or cough you would be in much pain’, ‘I shouldn’t sneeze without a pillow
on my belly, I can’t bend . . . My back hurt for three months . . . no one told me that I needed
to cope with this much pain afterwards’, ‘I was very happy but my pain was stronger than my
happiness’.95 It is also worth remembering that the pain of PGP, described in Section
II.C.1, was identified in 33% of women 12 weeks after delivery, and 5% of women may
experience PGP pain years after delivery.96
The vaginal tearing experienced by 80% of women must heal, and while estimates
of the rates of the most severe (third and fourth degrees) tearing vary between 0.5%
and 10% of laboring women, even mild tearing (second degree) can result in lasting
pain during sexual intercourse (3 or 6 months later) as well as fecal incontinence.97
In fact, these problems are found frequently 4–8 years after giving birth even among
women who never experienced a tear.98 Women are less likely to experience tearing if
they deliver via cesarean section, which accounts for nearly one-third of all deliveries in
the USA.99 However, these deliveries bring their own post-labor complications.100 In
addition to major pain at the incision site, which can continue for 6 months,101 infections, which are potentially fatal, occur after more than 6% of cesarean deliveries.102
6–18% of women who deliver via c-section will develop chronic pain at the site of
their incision.103 Both vaginal delivery with tears and delivery by cesarean section are
associated with incontinence 5–10 years after delivery.104
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS

This article is less an examination of rhetoric than an examination of a lack of rhetoric.
It is an examination of the absence of women’s pain and physical burdens from the
abortion discussion in judicial opinions. Legal opinions in the areas of search and
seizure, bodily integrity, and substantive due process have acknowledged the relevance
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These effects interfere with sexual activity and make anxiety and postpartum
depression more likely,105 as does the persistent pain that affects so many postpartum
women.106 Estimates of postpartum depression itself range from affecting as low as
10% of postpartum women107 up to more than one-third of postpartum women.108
Metaphors women use to describe their experiences with postpartum depression
include ‘being hit by a ton of bricks . . . living in a nightmare, feeling trapped, being
in the middle of the sea, feeling like an alien, . . . feeling like garbage, and hitting rock
bottom’.109 ‘It’s like the end of the world, really. You’ve got nothing to live for . . . it’s a bit
like you’re just stuck in this room and you can’t get out, and there’s nothing for you . . . it’s
just like you’ve died inside’.110
Even the threat to a woman’s life does not end with delivery. Deep vein thrombosis,
infection, and postpartum hemorrhage can occur after a woman has gone home from
the hospital.111 In fact, the CDC states that one-third of pregnancy-related deaths occur
between 1 week and 1 year after delivery.112 Seventeen per cent of these deaths are from
suicide by women suffering from postpartum depression.113
The above details are just a sampling of the physical and mental ramifications of
carrying a child to term. Throughout the entire process of pregnancy, birth, and for
years after, these effects can be constant, fundamentally altering women’s lives by causing them actual pain. Given the tangible and bodily requirements on women in order to
birth a child, one might expect that this suffering factor in the consideration of women’s
rights to terminate their pregnancies. Yet, as is discussed below, acknowledgment of
these burdens is almost wholly ignored by judges. Instead, courts shy from descriptions
of the actual physical burden on mothers, and the failure to recognize the burden then
condones it.114
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115 Mona Lynch, Penal Artifacts: Mining Documents to Advance Punishment and Society Theory, in Q ualitative
Research in Criminology, 271, 276 ( Jody Miller & Wilson Palacios eds., 2015).
116 Lynch, supra note 118 at 276; Jeffrey Budziak, Matthew P. Hitt, and Daniel Lempert. Determinants of Writing
Style on the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, 7 J. L. Courts 1 (2019).
117 Christopher Krewson, Strategic Sensationalism: Why Justices Use Emotional Appeals in Supreme Court
Opinions, 40 Just. Sys. J. 319 (2019).
118 Ryan C. Black, Matthew E.K. Hall, Ryan J. Owens, and Eve M. Ringsmuth, The Role of Emotional Language
in Briefs Before the US Supreme Court, 4 J. Law. Courts 377 (2016).
119 Black, supra note 121; Austin Sarat, Killing Me Softly: Capital Punishment and the Technologies for Taking Life,
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of pain and physical intrusion to individuals’ rights. These cases have suggested a
primary, personal, and individual interest in avoiding pain, which is to be respected
(in the cases where the issues are acknowledged). Rights have increased in response,
in part, to that acknowledgement.
Social artifacts, such as legal opinions, ‘may convey[] meaning by its latent and
manifest content, as well as by its silences or omissions’.115 Legal opinions are strategic
communications, purposefully written in order to shape the behavior of other actors,
constrained by institutional conventions, norms, and procedural rules.116 Therefore,
legal opinions do not necessarily represent cultural understandings in the way conversation or archives may; instead, they demonstrate what actors believe will work in order
to mobilize support or win in a given circumstance. Emotional writing in particular may
be used in order to mobilize popular support and opposition to established doctrine,117
although there is some disagreement about whether or not this works.118 Black et al.
found that excessive reliance on affective language (including discussing pain) seemed
to signal to judges that one’s case was weak, while Austin Sarat and Mona Lynch have
suggested that obfuscation of pain is necessary to protect the continued use of the death
penalty.119 Still, it is clear that judges and legal actors use affective language in order to
mobilize and affect readers and listeners and that legal language affects the direction of
social movements as well as individuals’ understandings of their own circumstances.120
This research does not ask whether language of pain is compelling or successful,
it is not a comparative study of the discussion of pain in one region of the USA
versus another, nor does it differentiate between dissenting and majority opinions.
Rather, I suggest that the very acknowledgment of women’s existence is in question.
As Luker has shown, the language used in social movements is influenced by activists’
understandings of what language may be successful; and it also influences women’s
own understandings of the burdens and difficulties they experience or see their loved
ones experience.121 Therefore, it matters whether and how these burdens and risks of
pregnancy are discussed, when and if they are discussed. The central question in this
exploratory research is—what is the role of pain in judicial opinions on abortion, as
opposed to other areas? To what extent are the physical ramifications of pregnancy
and labor acknowledged; and how does that acknowledgment compare to the role of
physical ramifications of abortion to the fetus or the pregnant person? The research
therefore focused in on two specific research questions:
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(1) To what extent is the pain of pregnancy acknowledged in these discussions?
(2) What do judges talk about when they talk about pain and abortion?
A. Search Strategy

B. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion criteria entailed judicial opinions containing a discussion of a right to access
to abortion. These opinions included cases related to medical access of incarcerated
women (eight opinions), state or federal funding for abortion services (25 opinions),
and suits brought by abortion providers to declare statutory limitations on the right to
abortion unconstitutional (190 opinions). Suits against abortion providers for wrongful death, murder prosecutions, wrongful birth suits, criminal prosecutions discussing
pregnancy as serious physical injury, and immigration suits for asylum appeared in the
search but were excluded. Suits for public funding of non-abortion services and for
insurance funding for religious family planning services were also excluded.
C. Data Extraction

All retrieved opinions were stored in NVIVO 12 Plus software. NVIVO software was
used to automatically code references to ‘pain’, ‘health’, ‘risk’, and ‘life’. The author
122 Victoria v. Larpenter, 2001 WL 674156 June 14, 2001.
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A search was performed using Weslaw’s database. The search included federal and state
judicial opinions, published and unpublished, from January 1, 1974 to August 16, 2021.
Out of a desire to limit the search to discussions of the constitutional protection of
abortion access and the treatment of pain in these discussions, the search was structured
in an effort to retrieve opinions that discussed abortion as a significant portion of the
opinion. Therefore, search terms were applied as follows (ATLEAST5Abortion) AND
(pain). This retrieved all opinions wherein abortion is mentioned at least five times and
pain is mentioned at least once. These mentions may happen anywhere in the opinion
and need not be close to each other.
The search was limited to opinions mentioning abortion at least five times in order
to make some effort to avoid running too far afield of the abortion issue. Even with
such limitations, the vast majority of opinions returned only mentioned abortion and
were not primarily concerned with the legality or constitutional protection of abortion
access (as described in the inclusion criteria below). In order to verify that limiting the
search to opinions using the word ‘abortion’ five times had not excluded an abundance
of relevant material, a second search was run to find cases mentioning abortion three
times or more (search terms (ATLEAST3Abortion) AND (pain)), and cases appearing
in the second search were skimmed to determine how many would be included under
the inclusion and exclusion criteria below. Of the 334 additional opinions found in the
new search, only one document, an order related to discovery requests in a case found
in the smaller search, would arguably have met the inclusion criteria, and its discussion
of pain was limited to statements that the plaintiff was suing for pain and suffering.122
While it is possible that relevant opinions mention the word ‘abortion’ only one or two
times, these results suggest limiting the search to opinions mentioning abortion at least
five times is reasonable.
The search was not otherwise limited. It returned a total of 814 judicial opinions.
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IV. FINDINGS
A. When Pain Matters

The first, most easily quantified finding is that the pain of pregnancy is articulated far
less often than the (still hypothetical and vigorously debated) pain of the fetus. This
echoes the findings of Mary Ziegler who shows that the anti-abortion movement has
specifically focused on the concept of fetal ‘pain’, successfully moving the abortion
debate toward the interests of the fetus and away from acknowledgment of the interests
of the pregnant person.123
In all, out of 223 judicial opinions ruling on constitutional challenges to abortion
regulations, only 28 opinions mention the pain of labor or pains from pregnancy. This
pain is mentioned 46 times over those 28 opinions, with 16 opinions mentioning it only
once and another seven mentioning it twice (see Table 1). By contrast, the comparative
pain of various abortion procedures is mentioned 150 times over 51 judicial opinions
(see Table 2), while fetal ‘pain’ is mentioned 410 times over 60 of the 223 judicial
opinions (see Table 3). Of those opinions, 22% (13 opinions) mention fetal ‘pain’
10 times or more, which is more than twice the maximum number of mentions
of the pain of labor or pregnancy, including four opinions that mention fetal ‘pain’
123 Mary Ziegler, The Conservative Magna Carta, 94 North Carolina L. Rev. 1653, 1661 (2016). See also
Lynne Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 Albany L. Rev. 999,
1000, 1012 (1999); Reva Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Quality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 991, 1021 (2007) (discussing the prioritization of rhetoric on
the personhood of the fetus in the 1970s–90s).
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then evaluated each instance to extract substantive data regarding the subject of the
language. Extracted data included whether health referred to the pregnant person or
the fetus, excluding references that did not fit in either category (such as references to
‘health care’ or ‘department of health’); whether life referred to the pregnant person’s
life or the fetus’s life; whether pain referred to fetal pain, the pregnant person’s pain
in relation to abortion, or the pregnant person’s pain in relation to pregnancy or
childbirth, excluding rhetorical (eg ‘it is painfully obvious’ or ‘the defense is at pains
to explain’); and whether tearing referred to tearing of the pregnant person’s body or of
the fetus’s body. The author also extracted and coded instances of discussion of the
health risks that accompany pregnancy, childbirth, postpartum, and abortion. After
preliminary analysis, automatic text search was used as well to code ‘tear’, ‘torn’, and
‘perforation’. The author extracted information as to whether the dispute was in state
or federal court, and separate codes for each aspect were created in order to be able to
perform comparative analysis in the future.
Cases were coded using NVIVO software. Coding that had been assigned to data
in case syllabi and headnotes sections were removed. All extraction and coding was
performed by the author.
This analysis is limited to the rhetoric of these judicial opinions. Rhetoric and
argument made in briefs submitted in connection to these cases, as well as in law
reviews and advocacy documents, are currently under analysis and will be the subject
of future research. However, this exploratory article is confined to the question of
judicial rhetoric, which has been found to influence future advocacy and future judicial
opinions.
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Table 1. Discussion of pain of pregnancy and childbirth.
Mentions

Opinions

Total mentions

1
2
3
4

16
7
4
1
28

16
14
12
4
46

Mentions

Opinions

Total mentions

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
23

24
11
4
4
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
51

24
22
12
16
6
12
7
8
9
11
23
150

20–30 times, one opinion where it is mentioned 38 times, and one opinion where it
is mentioned 67 times (see Table 3).
Clearly, the number of mentions varies widely and is heavily influenced by outliers.
Moreover, as stated above, a true quantitative analysis is not appropriate for this data.
However, it is striking that the pain of abortion is mentioned three times as often as the
pain of pregnancy and childbirth in fewer than twice as many opinions, and fetal ‘pain’ is
mentioned nearly nine times as often in just over twice as many opinions. Additionally,
no opinion mentions the pain of pregnancy or childbirth more often than four times,
while nearly a third of the opinions mentioning fetal ‘pain’ mention it more than four
times, and 20% of the opinions mentioning fetal ‘pain’ mention it nine times or more.
This stark contrast is reflected in substantive analysis of the opinions as well. Of
the 46 references to woman’s non-abortion pain in these cases, four references are
to the psychological pain of carrying a child (with physical pain not mentioned at
all) (see Table 4). Ten references are to the pain that accompanies only specific types
of aggravating conditions rather than the pain of pregnancy or childbirth itself (see
Table 4). Seven are specifically in the context of delay of an abortion that will happen
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Table 2. Discussion of pain of abortion.
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Table 3. Discussion of fetal ‘pain’.
Opinions

Total mentions

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
14
15
23
27
29
38
67

29
5
4
1
3
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
60

29
10
12
4
15
6
7
8
18
20
24
14
30
23
27
58
38
67
410

Table 4. Types of pain experienced by women, discussed in abortion opinions.
Type

Mentions

Associated with abortion
Women’s non-abortion pain
Caused by an aggravating condition
Abortion will happen eventually
Psychological
Remaining mentions

150
10
7
4
25

“Remaining mentions” in bold describe the only mentions of pain that might address normal pain of pregnancy and
childbirth.

eventually (see Table 4). In other words, the actual pain of pregnancy and childbirth
‘itself’ (shown in bold in Table 4) are almost never acknowledged in these opinions.
In all, fetal ‘pain’ is mentioned twice as often as women’s pain. When women’s pain
is mentioned, it is almost exclusively in relation to an abortion that will absolutely
occur and there is almost no (25 times, as opposed to the 410 mentions of fetal ‘pain’)
reference to the physical pain that naturally occurs over the course of any normally
progressing pregnancy or labor.
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124 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
125 These considerations begin our analysis of the woman’s interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it,
for this reason: though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than
a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist
in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these
procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and,
depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted. Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow
that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a
sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term
is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices
have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in
the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist
she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992)
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1. The Natural Pain of Pregnancy and Labor
In the 28 opinions that do discuss the pain that naturally accompanies pregnancy and
childbirth, that pain is discussed using euphemisms and vague language most often as a
single sentence and is then quickly abandoned. Indeed, seven such mentions are a quote
of a single line offered in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, ‘The
mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to
pain that only she must bear’.124
This section of the Casey opinion (the only phrase to acknowledge the pain of
pregnancy and labor) is worth highlighting. The majority opinion begins this section by
addressing the liberty interest in deciding for oneself when life begins—not the liberty
interest in controlling one’s own body, or avoiding intense pain or bodily damage. It
states ‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State’.
In the paragraph containing the reference to pain itself, the majority begins and
thereby frames the paragraph with the ‘consequences [of abortion] for others’; those
being the fetus, the pregnant person’s family, and the rest of society. Only after that
framing does the opinion move into the ‘anxieties, physical constraints, and pain that
only she must bear’; and only for a moment. The opinion directly adopts a view of
these burdens as the sacrifices of motherhood, which ‘have from the beginning of the
human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others
and gives to the infant a bond of love’. It then quickly moves away from the pain and
burden of pregnancy and labor, never having actually described or addressed them in
full, referring to it as ‘suffering’ that is ‘intimate and personal’, and then removing to the
vague topics of a woman’s destiny, role, and ‘conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society’.125
The majority’s opinion echoes a dissenting opinion, predating Roe v. Wade by several
years, yet describing the repercussions of forced childbirth in a manner similar to Casey.
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There, the pain of pregnancy and labor is avoided; first indirectly touched upon (‘the
thought . . . is not a pleasant one’) and then acknowledged but only as a minor point
(‘the matter cuts much deeper than mere physical pain’). The pain itself is neither
directly addressed nor described.
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall briefly touched on the physical
dangers and pains of childbirth only to immediately progress to discuss the cycle of
poverty and effects on the woman’s family:
‘An unwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of any woman, but the impact
is felt most by those too poor to ameliorate those effects . . . ., a poor woman may feel that she is
forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses a serious threat to her health and even her life . . .
If she refuses to take this risk, and undergoes the pain and danger of state-financed pregnancy
and childbirth, she may well give up all chance of escaping the cycle of poverty. Absent day-care
facilities, she will be forced into full-time child care for years to come[discussion of financial effects
continues] . . . ’.127

This was also quoted by Judge Pashman, concurring in Right to Choose v. Byrne.128
Justice Douglas argued similarly in Roe v. Wade itself, suggesting,
‘rejected applicants under the Georgia statute are required to endure the discomforts of pregnancy; to incur the pain, higher mortality rate, and aftereffects of childbirth; to abandon
educational plans; to sustain loss of income; to forgo the satisfactions of careers; to tax further
mental and physical health in providing child care; and, in some cases, to bear the lifelong
stigma of unwed motherhood, a badge which may haunt, if not deter, later legitimate family
relationships’.129

In Victoria W. v. Larpenter, the issue of ‘substantial physical pain and discomfort’
through delivery was brought by an incarcerated woman, as an Eighth Amendment
claim for denial of medically necessary treatment.130 The court dismissed the claim
as unpersuasive, with no discussion of the actual pain or discomfort involved in labor
126
127
128
129
130

Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F.Supp. 1217, 1235 (1970) (citations omitted).
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 454, 458–9 (1977).
91 N.J. 287, 325 (1982).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 214–15 (1973)
205 F.Supp.2d 580 (2002).
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‘It is difficult to overstate the importance of what the mother has at stake. In physical terms alone
the thought of making a mother carry and bear a child against her will is not a pleasant one. But
the matter cuts much deeper than mere physical pain. Carrying and bearing a child may involve
anxiety and trauma and great psychic pain . . . . Infrequently it results in suicide. In some cases
the child may be born deformed, or the birth may in this or other respects impair the physical
and mental health of the mother. Poor families, with little ability to take advantage of means of
self-protection that are of easy access to the rich . . . , often suffer physical, and therefore possibly
other kinds of deprivation by the constant birth of children. But perhaps most important, the
birth of a child unalterably affects the emotional lives of both mother and child. At its best, it
makes possible a relationship of love; at its worst, it creates an unwanted child. When the State
seeks to touch the very core of a person’s being in such a fashion, and to thrust upon mother
and (potential) child such a relationship by force, ‘it violates “those “fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions””’?126 .
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‘The long tasks of pregnancy require prenatal care on the woman’s part that the woman
whose pregnancy is unwanted has neither the will nor the resources of patience to carry out
effectively. If the pregnancy is complicated and requires extraordinary medical attention and
patient response and cooperation, the woman whose pregnancy is unwanted fails in response
and cooperation, and every risk of the pregnancy is enhanced. Drs. Romney and Sloan pointed
out that the woman whose pregnancy is unwanted will tend to have prolonged and difficult labor,
dysfunctional uterine labor, and to require resort to Caesarian section or forceps delivery because
of the protraction of the painful labor. Dr. Romney testified that the pregnant woman must be
motivated to carry out the physical responsibilities of pregnancy, that the prognoses for wanted
and unwanted pregnancies are different, and that the woman’s failure in attitude, cooperation
and motivation can result in the evolution of potential complications into reality . . . ’
And, in describing testimony regarding a Jewish view on abortion,
‘A very young bride who might be harmed by a pregnancy may be commanded to make use of
either contraception or abortion, the two being viewed in the same light. There is a principle that
has recognition permitting women whose birth pains would be extreme to seek sterilization or
abortion in order to avoid the pain. Mental anguish that is life-threatening may be a ground of
abortion’.

Even in McRae, the pain of childbirth is simply that—a word, pain, mentioned and then
quickly abandoned. To put this in context, it is valuable to look at the way the courts
describe fetal ‘pain’.
2. Fetal ‘Pain’
Discussions of the possibility of fetal ‘pain’ are far more widespread and are far more
in depth as the number of references to fetal ‘pain’ itself suggests, even while its very
existence is in question. For instance, in Carhart v. Ashcroft,133 the court devotes three
pages to the recitation of testimony on fetal ‘pain’ alone and two more on its legal
conclusions regarding fetal ‘pain’, and these are not the only sections where the issue
comes up. In this case alone, fetal ‘pain’ is mentioned 67 times, while the pain of
pregnancy and childbirth is mentioned three times; and the mentions of the pain of
childbirth are not actually discussion (or even mention) of that pain itself but are
rather reference to a testifying doctor’s concern that laboring women might forgo pain
medication out of fear that the medication would damage their child.

131 904 F.Supp. 1434 (1995).
132 491 F.Supp. 630, 672, 696 (1980).
133 287 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (2003).
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and delivery, nor of the risks of maternal mortality. In A Woman’s Choice-East Side
Women’s Clinic v. Newman, the court acknowledged, briefly, that pregnancy itself can be
dangerous, although that inherent danger is hidden, sandwiched between more specific
special conditions.131 Moreover, the only references to pain are to the pain of continued
pregnancy while awaiting a delayed abortion—the pain of pregnancy and labor itself is
not acknowledged.
The closest any judicial opinion comes to giving any real weight to the question of
the pain of childbirth itself comes in McRae v. Califano, although even here the issue is
couched in concern for the delivery of the child.132 The court noted,
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3. Surrounding Context: The Details of the Procedure
Adding to the affective nature of the mention of fetal ‘pain’, and the comparative
absence of the pain of labor, is the attention given to the process of abortion itself.
When fetal ‘pain’ is discussed in Carhart v. Ashcroft, Isaacson v. Thorne, Women’s Medical
Professional v. Taft, and over a dozen other cases, it is discussed in the context of an
excruciatingly detailed description of the process of abortion itself. A brief excerpt from
Isaacson v. Thorne is,
‘After sufficient dilation the surgical operation can commence. The woman is placed under
general anesthesia or conscious sedation. The doctor, often guided by ultrasound, inserts grasping
forceps through the woman’s cervix and into the uterus to grab the fetus. The doctor grips a fetal
part with the forceps and pulls it back through the cervix and vagina, continuing to pull even
after meeting resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the fetus to tear apart. For example,
a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through the cervix and out of the woman. The
process of evacuating the fetus piece by piece continues until it has been completely removed . . . ’

This is only a portion of one paragraph out of four paragraphs that make up the page
directly preceding the discussion of fetal ‘pain’. No comparable description of labor is
available in these cases. The rhetoric surrounding the fetus is graphic—the language
above regarding the fetus being ‘torn apart’ exemplifies the treatment of the fetus’s
potential pain, appearing 50 times over 16 opinions. Reference to tearing a pregnant
person’s body during an abortion, in contrast, occurs only 23 times in eight opinions.
It is not that this tearing is irrelevant—to the contrary, a main reason the intact D&E138
134
135
136
137
138

884 F.Supp.2d 961 (2012).
320 F.Supp.2d 957 (2004).
911 F.Supp. 1051 (1995).
373 F.Supp.3d 807.
The D&E method of abortion is the most commonly used method to perform a second trimester abortion.
It involves dilating the cervix and then using suction to evacuate the contents of the uterus, including the
fetus. It is most commonly used because it results in the fewest complications for women. Intact D&E,
or D&X, is the procedure sometimes referred to as ‘partial birth abortion’, wherein the fetus is removed
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While Carhart v. Ashcroft is an extreme case in terms of mentions of fetal ‘pain’, the
content is not in any way unusual. As an example, while Isaacson v. Horne only specifically mentions fetal ‘pain’ eight times, several of those mentions are contained in three
substantive paragraphs discussing needles, pain sensors, and sensory responses.134
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft (2004) devotes two pages solely
to the scientific questions of the existence of fetal ‘pain’, as well as including other
mentions, such as whether a fetus ‘visibly showed signs of pain’.135 Women’s Medical
Professional Corp. v. Voinovich offers over a full page to a discussion of the existence, or
nonexistence, of fetal ‘pain’,136 as does EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Meier
(2019).137
Often, these extensive descriptions on the arguments over fetal ‘pain’ are a judicial summary of evidence (expert testimony) that was presented at the trial level, or
evidence that may be presented in the future. As far as can be seen from the judicial
opinions, there is no comparable testimony on the pain of the pregnant person in
pregnancy or in labor.

•

26

Pain that only she must bear

‘The risks of performing a D & E are trauma to the uterus and cervix, such as laceration
and tearing caused by dilation or “pushing an instrument through . . . the wall of the uterus,”
resulting in injury to the bowel, bladder, or other nearby organs; extensive blood loss in situations
where the uterus “does not contract well”; and “rare, very serious complications” like amniotic
fluid embolism, disseminated intravascular coagulopathy, and infection caused by retained
pregnancy tissue’.144

While perforations and tearing of the cervix are a thing that can happen to depersonalized body parts over the course of an abortion, the fetus is alive and is actively ‘torn
apart’. The imagery of tearing is used repeatedly, eg ‘The policy embodied in S.B. 95—
that living babies not be “torn limb from limb”’;145 ‘as the abortion doctor “cut[s] or rip[s] the
piece from the body” . . . The fetus dies just as an adult experiencing corporal dismemberment
would—by bleeding to death as his or her body is torn apart’.146 Alternately, see West
Alabama Women’s Center v. Williamson.147 The first sentences in the opinion set the
tone (at 1314)

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

fully intact from the uterus. It is preferred by some doctors because it involves fewer instances of pushing
medical instruments into a woman’s uterus, thereby further reducing risks. See Megan Donovan, D&E
Abortion Bans: The Implications of Banning the Most Common Second-Trimester Procedure, Gutmacher
Institute Feb. 21, 2017, https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2017/02/de-abortion-bans-implications-ba
nning-most-common-second-trimester-procedure; Julie Rovner, ‘Partial-Birth Abortion’: Separating Fact
From Spin, NPR.org, Feb. 21, 2006, https://www.npr.org/2006/02/21/5168163/partial-birth-abortionseparating-fact-from-spin.
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F.Supp.2d 436, 44 (2004).
Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F.Supp.2d 478, 485 (1998).
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 52 Kan.App.2d 274, 280 (2016).
Evans v. Kelley, 977 F.Supp. 1283, 1295 (1997).
Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 948 (2004).
Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1110 (1998).
Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 709 (2019).
Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 2020 WL 6218657 at 11 (dissenting opinion) (2020).
900 F.3d 1310 (2018).

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/9/1/lsac003/6548698 by guest on 09 May 2022

method of abortion is used is in order to protect the pregnant person from unnecessary
damage to internal organs by limiting the number of times dangerous instruments
are forced into their bodies. The issue itself arises often, appearing as a reference
191 times over 52 of the 223 judicial opinions on abortion. But it is discussed as a
‘perforation’ that ‘is a risk’ and seemingly occurs by itself. For instance, ‘D & X may
reduce the risk of uterine perforation and embolism of cerebral tissue into the woman’s blood
stream’;139 ‘As its “elements are part of established obstetric techniques,” id., the procedure
may be presumed to pose similar risks of cervical laceration and uterine perforation’;140 and
‘Requiring transection prior to a D & E increases procedure time, makes the procedure more
complex, and increases risks of pain, infection, uterine perforation, and bleeding’.141 Here, the
uterus and cervix merely exist and perforation is a thing that happens, somehow, sometimes.
Similarly, ‘D & Es are associated with a number of potential complications, including uterine
perforation, infection, retained products of conception, and tearing of the cervix’;142 ‘cervical
lacerations or tears are “observed frequently as part of the natural physiologic process of
labor”’;143 and
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‘This case involves a method of abortion that is clinically referred to as Dilation and Evacuation
(D & E). Or dismemberment abortion, as the State less clinically calls it. That name is more
accurate because the method involves tearing apart and extracting piece-by-piece from the uterus
what was until then a living unborn child . . . ’

And later:

Much as the court in West Alabama Women’s Center v. Williamson claims to desire
to ‘look the facts in the face’, one should compare the above description of fetal
dismemberment to its description of the risks posed to women by the replacement
abortion methods the state has suggested.
‘The district court rejected that position and concluded that each of the fetal demise methods
carry “significant health risks.” It found that potassium chloride injections can cause uterine
perforation and infection and cardiac arrest if introduced into the bloodstream. That umbilical
cord transection raises the risk of hemorrhage and uterine infection and injury. And that digoxin
injections increase the risk of hemorrhage, infection, and extramural delivery’.

The fetus is torn apart and bleeds to death. By contrast, the pregnant person is at risk of
hemorrhage (ie bleeding, possibly to death), cardiac arrest (not heart attack, nor death),
and unspecified ‘injury’. Indeed, in this entire opinion, only the fetus can die (the word
‘death’ appears only in reference to the fetus) except for in that rare circumstance where
an abortion is justified by risk to the pregnant person’s life (and such occurrences
are brief and minor, see discussion below). By this language, the fetus is killed by an
abortion, but the pregnant person is certainly not at risk of being killed. The death
that stands at the other side of hemorrhaging is unspoken and neither purposeful nor
directed (as is killing the fetus). It is merely a disembodied and vaguely mentioned risk
despite the fact that it, too, occurs due to the performance of a procedure performed
for the purposes for protecting another being from pain (a pain that is still medically
debated).
There is no case that describes in such detail how a woman’s insides may be ripped
apart by the repeated insertion of medical instruments into her body. No case asserts
that a doctor, in trying to protect a fetus, may tear into a woman’s internal organs or kill
148 West Alabama Women’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310 (2018) 1318, 1319–20 (citations omitted).
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‘The district court did not decide whether the State had a legitimate interest in requiring that
the unborn child be humanely killed before it is torn apart. It only assumed the State did. But, to
borrow Holmes’ words from another setting, “[t]his is not a matter for polite assumptions; we
must look facts in the face.” . . .
In this type of abortion the unborn child dies the way anyone else would if dismembered alive. “It
bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb.” It can, however, “survive for a time while its limbs
are being torn off.” The plaintiff practitioner in the Stenberg case testified that using ultrasound
he had observed a heartbeat even with “extensive parts of the fetus removed.” But the heartbeat
cannot last. At the end of the abortion—after the larger pieces of the unborn child have been
torn off with forceps and the remaining pieces sucked out with a vacuum—the “abortionist is
left with ‘a tray full of pieces.’” It is no wonder that Justice Ginsburg has described this method
of abortion as “gruesome” and “brutal.” (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) . . . ’.148
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B. Comparative Health Risks

This pattern plays out again in the debates over pregnant people’s interest in their own
health. The comparative health risks of various types of abortion are a running theme
throughout these cases. The risks involved in carrying a child to term are mentioned
often—230 times over 67 of the 223 judicial opinions. The health risks of carrying a
child, and of various methods of abortion, are a central area of discussion in large part
because the law has made them as centrally relevant. Judicial doctrine has established
that a woman must be allowed to have an abortion if her own life and health are at
risk, and many informed consent statutes (and therefore descriptions of those statutes)
include references to informing a pregnant person of the potential risks of pregnancy
and labor. Statutes regulating or prohibiting abortion must include exceptions for the
circumstance where a pregnant person’s life or health is threatened by the pregnancy,
although cases disagree as to how immediate that threat must be. Judicial opinions
therefore regularly reference these arguments, and some explore them, at least to some
extent.149
But the extent of this exploration is precisely the issue. The descriptions of the health
risks to pregnant people are nearly as vague as the descriptions of their pain. Nearly half
of these opinions (30 opinions) mention the health risks of bearing a child only once,
while another 12 mention it twice. In these circumstances, the discussion is limited to
a simple acknowledgment (each of the following quotes is the sole acknowledgement
from a separate case):
‘The physician was required to describe the “probable gestational age of the unborn child
at the time [of] the abortion” and the “medical risks associated with carrying her child to
term”’;150
‘More recently, in Harris v. McRae, the Court upheld “the most restrictive version of the
Hyde Amendment,” which withheld from States federal funds under the Medicaid program
to reimburse the costs of abortions, “except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term”’;151
‘According to the studies with which Carhart is familiar, abortion at the earliest stage is
35 times safer than childbirth as far as complications are concerned. By the 20th week, the
risk of complications from abortion approximately equals that of childbirth’;152
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See also Spitzer, supra note 7, outlining centrality of the health exception.
American Medical Association v. Stenehjem, 412 F.Supp.3d 1134, 1150 (2019).
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 508 (1989) (citations omitted).
Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1117 (1998).
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her by causing her body to bleed uncontrollably. And even this medical, dry description
of the comparative risks of various abortion procedures is greater acknowledgement
than is granted to the risks and pain of pregnancy and childbirth.
Of the discussion of ‘tearing’, only one abortion case refers to the possibility of tearing that accompanies 80% of vaginal deliveries. That case mentions it twice in response
to a law mandating that only physicians perform abortions as a way of contextualizing
the comparative abilities of clinicians to physicians. Clinicians, the opinion notes, are
capable of suturing vaginal tears that occur during childbirth. This is the entire extent
of the discussion.
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153 Whole Woman’s Health Alliance v. Hill, 388 F.Supp.3d 1010, 1015 (2019).
154 41 F.Supp.2d 478, 502 (1998). This quote is also referenced in Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v.
Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 151 (2000).
155 Bernard v. Individual Members of Indiana Medical Licensing Board, 392 F.Supp.3d 935, 950 (2019).
156 Fischer v. Com., Dept. of Public Welfare, 66 Pa.Cmwlth. 70, n.1 (1982).
157 Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181, 205 n.76 (1980).
158 Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F.Supp.2d 795, 803 (1998).
159 Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F.Supp.2d 795, 803 (1998).
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‘Abortion generally has a low risk of fatal and nonfatal complications. The risk of death is
lower than that from a penicillin injection, as well as that from childbirth’. 153 .
What exactly is that risk from childbirth? The cases do not say. There is broad
acknowledgement that the risk of death is greater in childbirth than in abortion, and the
mortality rates of each are often recited. There is often acknowledgment, in a single isolated sentence, that abortion is ‘safer’ than childbirth. There are some few discussions
of the fact that carrying a pregnancy to term may involve risks of eclampsia, HELLP
syndrome, hyperemesis, and other exceptional conditions. In Planned Parenthood of
Cent. New Jersey v. Verniero, the court acknowledged that pregnancy can ‘exacerbate’
already existing exceptional conditions, such as ‘certain neurological and immunological diseases, liver or kidney disease, severe hypertension, cardiac conditions, and
diabetes’.154 But the specific risks and damage to a woman’s body from perfectly
normal pregnancy and childbirth are never detailed, certainly not in any language that
approaches the depth or breadth given to the abortion procedure.
Postpartum complications are almost never mentioned. The phrase ‘postpartum’
or ‘post-partum’ occurs in eight abortion opinions of which five are only referencing
the existence of postpartum care. Of the three remaining opinions, two mention
postpartum hemorrhage, one as a risk that can be increased by certain abortion procedures,155 and the other in a single sentence in a footnote referring to a petitioner’s prior
experience with postpartum hemorrhaging as a reason the petitioner and petitioner’s
doctor feel abortion is necessary for her health.156 The last opinion provides a statute, in
a footnote, requiring that, prior to an abortion, a physician informs the pregnant person
of opportunities for psychological care for ‘post-partum psychological damage’.157
It is not that the pain, demands, or risks from pregnancy and labor are never
acknowledged at all, but it is that references to them are fleeting and vague. This fact
stands out particularly in examinations of the induction method of abortion (where
labor of a nonviable fetus is induced). Efforts to prohibit D&X abortions naturally
lead to discussions of whether acceptable alternatives are available. In these cases, the
induction method is often found to be lacking as a replacement for D&X or D&E,
because, for instance, ‘[since] labor is induced before term, an induction abortion
involves the same physiological stress, emotional stress, medical complications, and
risks as does labor and delivery at term’.158 Similarly, hysterotomy is rejected as a viable
alternative because ‘it involves even more blood loss and other damage than does a
cesarean section’.159 But how much blood loss does a cesarean section involve? What
is this physiological stress and emotional stress that accompanies labor, justifying a
different method of abortion? What are the possible medical complications of labor?
These factors are not articulated and are not even mentioned in the discussions of the
risks and dangers of carrying a pregnancy to term.
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V. DISCUSSION

There are several explanations that might be offered as to why so much more detail and
attention is paid to fleshing out the interests of the fetus, while the pregnant person is
disembodied, their pain is vague and remote, and their risks are presented in abstract
and clinical terms. One is relevance. Legal opinions are constrained by the norms and
structures of the law. As Roe and Casey established a right to abortion prior to viability,
and most cases have continued to support that right, the interests of women in having
abortions prior to viability may seem irrelevant because the issue is resolved by the
state’s presumed lack of a compelling interest in the fetus. By contrast, the question of
fetal ‘pain’ has spurred a great deal of anti-abortion legislation which in turn has spurred
160
161
162
163

491 F.Supp. 630 (1980).
Pub.L. 96–123, 109, 93 Stat. 926. See also Pub.L. 96–86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 339–40 (1980).
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One single opinion, McRae v. Califano,160 offers an in-depth list of conditions and
situations that may turn pregnancy into a mortal or psychiatric threat for women.
The case was brought as a challenge to the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited
federal Medicaid funding for abortions except when ‘the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures
necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported
promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service’.161 The question of
the health implications of forbidding funding for first trimester abortion was therefore
central (as one would assume it to be in any of the Medicaid or state funding cases,
although this case is the only one to discuss these issues in such depth). The opinion
devotes over 14 pages, out of a 110-page opinion, to these issues. It does not detail the
pain of labor (its discussion of pain is outlined above), but it does offer a substantial
investigation into various conditions, many potentially fatal or permanently disabling,
that can be exacerbated or caused by pregnancy.
The opinion was reversed by the Supreme Court, with no discussion of these
health issues. While the Court acknowledged that the question of women’s health
was central to the right to abortion, and even outweighed a state’s compelling interest
in fetal life, Congress need not fund that abortion. Determining that some abortions
may be ‘medically necessary’, but that Congress could still choose not to subsidize
them, the Court omitted any reference to any of the conditions discussed in McRae,
essentially erasing the issues from the conversation.162 Three justices dissented from
the ruling. Of those, only Justice Marshall’s dissent (which was not joined by the other
dissenting justices) even discusses the threat pregnancy may pose to the health of a
pregnant person. That discussion is limited to mention (three sentences) of certain
existing and exceptional conditions which pregnancy may aggravate and ‘cases in which
severe mental disturbances will be created by unwanted pregnancies. The result of
such psychological disturbances may be suicide, attempts at self-abortion, or child
abuse’.163 Having summarized these health risks in a few sparse sentences, Justice
Marshall mentions in three other places that carrying a pregnancy to term can threaten
the health or life of the mother with no more detail.

Pain that only she must bear

•

31

164 See notes 40, 49–51, supra, and accompanying text.
165 See, eg Robin West Concurring in the Judgment, in What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, 129, 130 ( Jack
Balkin ed., 2005); Kimberly Mutcherson, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Feminist Judgements:
Rewritten Supreme Court Opinions (Stanchi, Berger, and Crawford eds. 2016), 154 (‘It is her heart,
her blood, and her body that must experience the wear and tear that comes from pregnancy . . . Swollen
feet, expanded girth, heartburn, thinning hair, nausea, and vomiting . . . Women can experience temporary
or permanent disability and even death as a consequence of pregnancy . . . ’).
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these cases. Therefore, long, detailed descriptions of fetal ‘pain’ may be offered by
proponents of anti-abortion legislation in order to support their argument and motivate
their supporters and by opponents in order to show that they understand the issues
involved.
Additionally, there is the question of strategy. Both pro- and anti-choice lawyers and
activists have reason to downplay the actual physical implications of pregnancy. On the
part of anti-choice activists, this stems from the desire to highlight the implications for
the fetus and portrays the fetus’s interests as vastly overwhelming the interests of the
pregnant person. Reducing the pregnant person to a dehumanized and depersonalized
collection of supportive organs facilitates this deprioritization of their interests. On the
part of pro-choice activists and lawyers, it is likely that the personal implications of
pregnancy are avoided in an effort to avoid a battle between the interests of the fetus and
the interests of the pregnant person. To this point, activists have argued for an almost
absolute right to abortion at least in the context of previability abortions. To focus on
women’s particular physical interests might be seen as opening the door to a balancing
of interests, almost accepting the notion that a previable fetus might rise to the level of
a protectable person whose interests could compete with the pregnant person.
It must also be acknowledged that the reluctance to describe this pain is not only
legal, or judicial. Pain, in general, resists description, and women resist describing this
pain.164 Even consciously feminist arguments in favor of the right to choose to abort
rarely offer more than a sentence or two to describe the physical burdens of pregnancy,
only briefly mentioning nausea, swelling, labor pain, and the risk of mortality and
morbidity.165 While it is clear that there exist doctors and scholars who find these issues
to be real and relevant, it is unclear that the risks have ever been fully described to the
judiciary.
However, the continual avoidance of the physical implications of pregnancy seems
to go farther than the simple strategic decisions or institutional constraints. The very
cases that make fetal ‘pain’ a question are a challenge to the protection of previability
abortions, necessarily implicating the interests at issue for women. Perhaps more
importantly, the question of pain itself does arise, often, in the context of the relative
pain of various methods of abortion. The question of the health risks to women that
are implicated by various methods of abortion is explored in detail. The question of
the health risks of pregnancy is often mentioned, and in the case of special conditions
in pregnancy (such as pre-eclampsia), this health risk is explored in some depth.
It is only the normal, everyday risks of pregnancy and childbirth where the issue is
almost completely avoided. While the health risks of bearing a child are mentioned,
and even mentioned often, like the pain of labor and pregnancy they are mentioned
in a sentence, touched upon briefly as if touching a hot pot on the stove, and then
quickly dropped. The discussion reaches as far as comparative mortality rates of labor
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A. The Erasure of Women in Motherhood

Many scholars have examined the rhetoric of judicial opinions in order to expose its
marginalization of women. These scholars have found that women’s perspectives are
rarely affirmed,166 women’s subjugation is protected by paternalistic narratives,167 and
that where it has been threatened, it has been in large part by co-opting a narrative of
women as victims.168 Women’s invisible labor and burdens on women in the home
are routinely ignored, or at least acknowledgement of those burdens is avoided.169
While not all women are mothers, the role of woman as mother, or potential mother,
particularly encourages this subjugation.
A steady theme of scholars of gender and law is that of the subjugation of women
into the role of mothers.170 Rhetoric of ‘mothers’ consistently reinforces the notion that
women should sacrifice all for their children, and the ideal mother is willing to do so—if
a woman develops interests that in some way conflict with their child’s, those interests
are rhetorically dismissed, generally ignored in the portrayal of the woman as mother,
who must have no interest outside of her child.171 Sacrifice is assumed to be an essential
aspect of motherhood, and there is no interest or cost so great that it can be prioritized
over a child’s interest.172 This assumption carries with it moral ramifications—women
who are not willing to sacrifice for their children are ‘bad’ and ‘selfish’, while good
women naturally prioritize motherhood and mothering over any non-child interests
they may have.173 It can be seen in pro-choice as well as anti-abortion arguments
166 Katie Gibson, The Women Take Over: Oral Argument, Rhetorical Skepticism, and the Performance of Feminist
Jurisprudence in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 105 Q uarterly J. Speech 319, 322–23 (2019);
Finley, supra note 16.
167 Carrie Crenshaw, The ‘Protection’ of ‘Women’: A History of Legal Attitudes Toward Women’s Workplace
Freedom, 81Q uarterly J. Speech 63 (1995); Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and
the Spread of Woman Protective Anti-Abortion Argument, 57 Duke L. J. 1690 (2008).
168 Condit, supra note 10 at 25–26.
169 Fineman, supra note 117.
170 Abrams, supra note 10 at 297; Condit, supra note 10 at 61–63; Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight,
71–98 (1993).
171 Linda Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis of Metaphor,
Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 Southern California Interdisciplinary
L. J. 259, 270, 272–3 (2009); Pam Lowe and Sarah-Jane Page, On the Wet Side of the Womb: The Construction of ‘Mothers’ in Anti-Abortion Activism in England and Wales, 26 European J. Women’s Studies
165 (2019); Pam Lowe, Reproductive Health and Maternal Sacrifice: Women, Choice and
Responsibility (2016); Sharon Hays, the Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood (1996).
172 Lowe and Page, supra note 171; Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an
American Community (1989); Lowe, supra note 171; Bordo, supra note 170.
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as opposed to abortion, or a mention of the pain of labor as a reason to avoid induction
abortion, and then it retreats. Morbidity (severe physical damage outside of death) is
almost wholly ignored. Even where other burdens of having children are explored, such
as the expense and emotional weight of caring for a child, the actual 9 months and
possibly days of the most intense pain that may ever occur in a woman’s life remain
unspoken, as do the months or years of pain that may well follow. There is no stirring
description of childbirth, as there is of abortion’s implications for the fetus. There is not
even the clinical description that is given in descriptions of the implications of abortion
for the pregnant person.
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173 Lowe and Page, supra note 174; Lowe, supra note 174; Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical
Power and Abortion Law (1997); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 301–303 (1992).
174 Lowe and Page, supra note 174; Lowe, supra note 174; Sheldon, supra note 176. See also Ronald
Dworkin Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual
Freedom, 58–59 (1993) (discussing a survey of women suggesting that many choose abortion because
of their feelings of responsibility to others in their lives).
175 Lowe and Page, supra note 174; Lowe, supra note 174; Luker, supra note 16 at 7–8; Reva Siegel, Siegel J.,
Concurring, in What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said ( Jack Balkin, ed., 2005); Mutcherson, supra note
168.
176 Luker, supra note 16, at 7–8.
177 Lowe, supra note 174.
178 Abrams, supra note 10 at 294.
179 Deborah Lupton, the Social Worlds of the Unborn (2013).
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in arguments, justifying abortion based on women’s responsibilities to their other
children, husbands, or families, and arguments that some women must have abortions
because they cannot be good mothers ‘now’, but abortion can help them be better
mothers to other ‘future’ children.174 It is likely that this moral judgement is associated
with long-standing cultural acceptance of the idea that a woman’s role is, first and
foremost, to bear children.175 As Luker argued, abortion rights are fundamentally
linked to the idea that women even have any interests at all outside of the primary
function of bearing children.176 Any such interests are seen as unnatural and are rarely
acknowledged unless as selfish, immoral, irresponsible desires.177
In the case of abortion arguments, the prioritization of childbearing often moves
well beyond moral judgement, all the way into complete erasure of the body of the
woman from the discussion. ‘The woman often is missing from decisions diluting the
right to choose; if she appears it will be in the role of passive patient, mother, or mere
body part’.178 Even the presence of the woman as a bodypart is rare, however—Lupton
(2013) demonstrates that pro-abortion messaging often presents images of the fetus
as if in a void, with no reference to the woman who will carry the fetus to term and
endure labor in order to bring it into the world.179 In these circumstances, women’s
pure physical burdens and interests are not only unimportant or evidence of selfishness,
they are entirely without representation, as if they do not exist at all.
The data above show that, in the case of abortion, the graphic and bodily details of
the implications for the fetus have been outlined in depth; but the graphic and bodily
details of the implications of pregnancy for a pregnant person are seemingly not only
absent but actively avoided. This supports the suggestion that judges, whether consciously or unconsciously, purposefully circumvent acknowledgement that pregnancy
and childbirth itself may harm a woman’s personal interests, or that such interests even
exist. These judges maintain the presumption that all women should ‘want’ children
and motherhood and that the only time when a woman might reasonably choose not
to be a mother is in the sad situation where social difficulties interfere with perfect
parenthood. That she might have reasons to simply not want to have a child is not
acceptable and therefore cannot be acknowledged. The actual, physical realities of
pregnancy and childbirth are personal to the pregnant person—mothers are simply
not supposed to have such personal interests. Indeed, women are not supposed to
have any interests that they prioritize above motherhood even before they are mothers.
Therefore, the courts cannot recognize these burdens in the way they recognize and
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articulate the invasion of a search of the body involving surgery or catheterization. But
until these interests are fully recognized, women will remain less than full persons.180
VI. CONCLUSION—LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY

180 Paltrow, supra note 126, at 1052.
181 Huang Hoon Chng Separate and Unequal: Judicial Rhetoric and Women’s Rights, 33 (2002);
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L.J. 997, 999 (1984).
182 Paltrow, supra note 126, at 1052.
183 Spitzer, supra note 7.
184 Jeanne Flavin our Bodies, our Crimes: The Policing of Women’s Reproduction in America,
67 (2009).
185 Lowe, supra note 6.
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Judicial opinions must be written in ‘a certain way’, and the ‘rules’ of legal relevance
constrain a great deal of their content; yet, still, judges are ‘free to innovate’ and
introduce themes and narratives in order to change the legal story.181 We see that
they have in fact introduced narratives prioritizing avoidance of invasion and pain in
the area of bodily integrity, substantive due process, and law enforcement searches
that penetrate the skin. Yet, in the case of abortion, certain topics, such as the actual
bodily nature of pregnancy and childbirth, have not appeared in the opinions. As Lynne
Paltrow states, such cases illustrate the fact that women still are not recognized as full
citizens, with equal rights regarding bodily integrity, personal autonomy, and medical
decision-making.182
This exploratory research offers strong evidence that women still are not recognized
as individuals independent of their potential motherhood. This carries obvious ramifications for the debate over abortion. Pregnancy is a high-risk state, bringing extreme
medical hazards.183 But even discussion of disease and mortality ignores important
aspects of women’s interests—namely, the physical experience and ramifications of
pregnancy itself. As Jeanne Flavin has highlighted, anti-abortion activists regularly turn
to adoption as an alternative to abortion, but this can only be done if the experience
of pregnancy, labor, and the physical ramifications that so often follow are entirely
discounted in the conversation.184
It is likely that the failure of judges to acknowledge the individual interests of
pregnant women is both influenced by social rejection of that idea and influences
that rejection. Indeed, medical research suggests that women themselves refuse to
acknowledge these interests, going so far as to erase and leave unnamed the extent of
the pain involved in labor. One study suggested that, while ‘only patients with acute
pain from the amputation of a digit or those with causalgia reported greater pain on
average than women in labor . . . some women who rated their pain at 4 or 5 on the
PPI numerical scale were unwilling to use the accompanying descriptors of “horrible”
or “excruciating” because “the positive experience of giving birth prevented them from
using words with such negative connotations.”’185 Many, or most, women consider
their labor to be ‘worth it’ or a positive experience overall; but continued refusal to
acknowledge the level of pain and intrusion involved with pregnancy and labor enables
the continued imposition of horrible and excruciating pain (in the absolute, medical
sense of the terms).
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186 Supra, note 6; note Justice White’s tacit endorsement of this view in his fear that ‘Surely it cannot be
argued that any abortion that is safer than delivery is medically necessary, since under such a definition an
abortion would be medically necessary in all pregnancies’. (emphasis added) Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 810 note 7 (1986) (White, dissenting).
187 Michele Goodwin, How the Criminalization of Pregnancy Robs Women of Reproductive Autonomy, Just
Reproduction: Reimagining Autonomy in Reproductive Medicine, Special Report, 47 Hastings Cent. Rep.
S19 (2017); Kelsey, C. M., Nickole Medel, Carson Mullins, Danielle Dallaire, and Catherine Forestell,
An Examination of Care Practices of Pregnant Women Incarcerated in Jail Facilities in the United States, 21
Maternal child health j. 1260 (2017) (over 50% of incarcerated women may be restrained while
delivering).
188 See note 122, supra, and accompanying text.
189 Condit, supra note 10, at 25.
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Additionally, the plight of incarcerated pregnant people should be particularly highlighted. Many states place hurdles in front of so-called ‘nontherapeutic’ abortions for
incarcerated pregnant people. As Spitzer has suggested, however, in very fundamental
ways all abortions are therapeutic.186 The relevance of the pain and ramifications of
delivery itself are even more compelling in the cases of women who may be shackled
while delivering, or may have more difficulty in receiving medical assistance for the
pains and illnesses associated with pregnancy.187 The lack of empathy, and the lack
of detail in description is most stunning in these cases, and returns to Sarat and
Lynch’s argument that conditions of incarceration may be maintained, perhaps, only
by avoiding description of the ramifications of that treatment.188 This erasure of a
woman’s very body exemplifies a refusal to acknowledge women’s interests that goes
well beyond the stigmatization and moral judgement that is often discussed in abortion
literature. It is particularly shocking, given the extremely bodily nature of pregnancy
and labor.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the answer to this issue is to simply
thrust women’s pain and burdens into the center of the conversation without careful
analysis. To the contrary, the persistent avoidance of recognition of women’s physical
personhood might be evidence of such a level of social rejection of this idea that any
such discussion would simply cause backlash and rejection. After all, in order to achieve
the right to abortion, activists had to ‘use rather than confront the beliefs and social
conditions [such as the nuclear family and woman’s primary role as mother] in the
existing American repertoire . . . respecting the crucial values and characterizations of
the culture while redefining the act of abortion itself’.189
Clearly, there is much work still to be done. This beginning research has not
separated majority and dissenting opinions. It looks only to those cases where pain is
addressed at all and largely ignores opinions that do not mention pain. Such opinions
may offer very different views on the burdens and implications of pregnancy and childbirth, although, clearly, without directly addressing the actual physical implications.
Future research should explore this rhetoric. To what extent do courts address the
purely individual ramification of pregnancy and childbirth, ‘without’ addressing pain
at all? Additionally, judicial opinions offer only one area of legal rhetoric surrounding
abortion. While these judicial opinions alone offer a significant dataset that must be
explored further, future research will address law review articles, advocacy, and popular
press. Relevant questions include the influence of gender on judicial acknowledgment
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of these issues, geographical distribution, and the impact of the level of the court (trial
or appellate).
A separate but extremely important area of research is the influence of racism on
this lack of empathy. The questions of the health risks to women have clear racial
implications, as maternal mortality and maternal morbidity affect Black women so
much more severely than other women. Additionally, research has already shown that
the pain of Black patients, and particularly Black women, is routinely dismissed and
ignored.190 Most of the challenges to legislation restricting abortion access are brought
by clinics that serve large numbers of minoritized populations. To what extent does the
refusal to acknowledge pregnant women’s pain relate to this racism?
‘Law, like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one another stories
about our relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority’; it also ‘limit[s]
the stories we can tell’.191 In 1984, Kristen Luker noted that it was the legal framing
of the abortion debate which enabled women to recognize their own personhood
independent of lives as wives or mothers. The legal and social refusal to acknowledge
the full depth and breadth of the experience of pregnancy and childbirth stunts this
recognition, maintaining women as always essentially potential mothers and refusing
to face the fact that women may have reason to choose not to be. By simply ignoring
any reference to the extent of the duration, pain, invasion, and indignity of pregnancy
and childbirth, the courts avoid inviting any empathy for pregnant women, and activists
and the public follow suit. If women are ever to achieve full personhood, their physical persons will have to be recognized as worthy of protection even in the face of
motherhood.

